Introduction
South Africa has a serious youth unemployment problem, with an unemployment rate of more than 50 per cent in the 15-24 age category (Stats SA, 2019) , see also Figure 1 . The share of youth in the same age category who are not in employment, education or training is 33%, and the expanded unemployment rate (including those not economically active) is above 65%. One of the main policy instruments that the government has used to combat youth unemployment is a wage subsidy system, called the Employment Tax Incentive (ETI). The policy was introduced in 2014 and is a tax credit targeted to the employers of young (below 30 years of age) and low-wage (below R6,000 a month) workers. The design of the subsidy enables a triple difference evaluation strategy, which this paper utilizes. The consensus view in the earlier economic work on the impacts of wage subsidies (such as Gruber 1997) suggests that since labour demand is typically more elastic than labour supply, the incidence of wage subsidies (or payroll tax reduction) falls on the employees. This means that earnings rise and the final gross wage cost to the employer is not affected. Hence, employment does not react either. However, recent work on Greece (Saez et al. 2012) , France (Cahuc et al. 2018) , and Sweden (Saez et al. 2019) indicates the opposite: earnings are not affected and hence the incidence is (mostly) on employers, opening up a way to positive employment impacts.
The literature is still inconclusive about what would be the optimal design for wage subsidies. According to Cahuc et al. (2018:1): Simulations of counterfactual policies show that the effectiveness of the hiring credit relied to a large extent on three features: it was unanticipated, temporary and targeted at jobs with rigid wages. (Cahuc et al. 2018:1) On the other hand, Saez et al. (2019:39) conclude that:
Some particular features of the tax cut we study may have enhanced its effectiveness. It was employer borne, salient, administered in a way to ensure nearperfect, immediate and automatic take-up, it targeted young workers but was encompassing (i.e. applied not just to new hires out of unemployment or a subset), it was intended to be permanent, and it was large.' (Saez et al. 2019: 39) We therefore have no general evidence about whether more targeted or more permanent systems work better. One would also need to know how employment subsidies work in an emerging economy such as South Africa. It is also important to examine whether the positive view on the cost effectiveness of hiring subsidies expressed in Brown (2015) and Brown and Koettl (2015) remains valid in the present case.
The paper contributes to the literature by examining the efficiency of wage subsidies in an emerging market context, where the capacity to administer the system (both in firms and within the administration) may be less perfect than in high-income countries. The sheer size of the unemployment crisis also makes evaluating the efficiency of the policy pressing. The maximum duration of the subsidy is 24 months, which means that the system is a hybrid between a (shortterm) hiring subsidy and a more permanent system. It was originally planned to be temporary and last for three years, was subsequently extended for another two years, and has recently been extended for ten more years. We use labour market survey data and the universe of payroll tax data from the South African Revenue Service (SARS) to examine the impacts of the system.
Since the system has been targeted at both low-wage and young workers, we can separate out any differential trends that have affected either young workers or low-wage workers in our triple differences identification strategy. There are some earlier studies evaluating the South African ETI policy. Ranchhod and Finn (2015) compare the development of youth and non-youth employment over time in a difference-in-differences (DD) fashion, but only for the first year after the reform. Ebrahim et al. (2017) compare ETI-claiming firms with firms that were eligible but did not take up the policy. Our identification is based on eligibility of workers, that is, we are mainly interested in the intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates, which identify the programme impacts, including the part that stems from partial take-up. Ours is also the first study to examine the earnings incidence of the policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional details of the subsidy. Section 3 discusses the conceptual background, Section 4 presents the data we use, and Section 5 the empirical strategy. The results from the survey data are presented in Section 6, and the results based on administrative data are available in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
Institutional framework
Proposals for a wage subsidy in South Africa were made by Heintz and Bowles (1996) soon after the first democratic election in 1994. Wage subsidies were proposed as part of South Africa's postapartheid growth strategy (Lewis 2001; Pollin et al. 2009 ).
The ETI, previously called the 'youth wage subsidy', was first conceptualized and proposed by the National Treasury in 2011. In a discussion paper, the National Treasury highlights the need to address the problem of youth unemployment in South Africa (National Treasury, 2011) . It emphasizes the necessity of a 'multi-pronged strategy to raise employment and support inclusion and social cohesion'. The discussion paper names economic growth and progress in the education system as two important components for solving the problem of youth unemployment.
The motivation behind the ETI lies in the context of large numbers of low or unskilled youths and rigidities in the labour market leading to a situation where the employment of youths is undesirable to firms. The stated aim of the subsidy is to address the low demand for youth workers by reducing the costs, and thereby risks, associated with employing youths. The aim was to target the policy at the age range of workers with the highest unemployment rate, namely those between the ages of 18 and 30 years.
The National Treasury discussion paper reviews ongoing active labour market policies aimed at the youth in South Africa. Sector Education Training Authorities (SETA), Learnership and Technical and Vocational Education and Training colleges (TVET, previously Further Education and Training (FET) colleges) were established to enhance the level of skill and education of the youth. SETAs and TVET colleges have been underfunded and are criticized for the poor management and poor quality of their lecturers (Bernstein et al. 2016) . A host of programmes such as the Graduate Development Programme (GDP), Job Preparation Programme (JPP), the National Youth Service, Jobs & Opportunity Seekers (Jobs), the Graduate Database, and Youth Advisory Centers were established by the National Youth Development Agency (NYDA) to provide job-search and job-matching assistance. The NYDA also hosts many entrepreneurship programmes to provide youths with assistance from the inception to the establishment of a small business.
These labour market policies are aimed at increasing individuals' education or skill levels, or labour supply interventions. This, however, has not always transferred into successful employment for youths (Altbeker et al. 2007 ). Even if one considers the scenario where youths have higher education and skill levels, the question remains as to whether there are sufficient jobs in the economy to absorb them. If too few jobs exist, then any increase in the skill levels of youths will limit the extent to which they are gainfully employed.
There have been two interventions aimed at increasing the demand for youth labour. The Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) and the Learnership programme. The EPWP gives individuals an average of 80 days of work but has not been found to change the future employment probabilities of workers (Altbeker et al. 2007 ). The Learnership programme provides incentives to firms that train young employees. The majority of those entering the Learnership programme were previously unemployed, indicating that the intervention is reaching the required target group. Visser and Kruss (2009) find that 76 per cent of those registered for high skill-level learnerships are employed two years after first registration, while only 46 per cent of those in the low-skills programme are employed two years later. Enrolment in the low-skills programme is double that of the high skills programme. This means that there is a large group of youths going through the Learnership programme but not finding suitable employment afterwards.
The ETI is similar in design to the Learnership programme. The Learnership programme was implemented in 2006 for a period of 10 years for workers aged 16 to 35 years old. In the Learnership programme, firms can claim a tax subsidy for training workers while employed. Similarly, firms hiring ETI-eligible employees can claim a tax subsidy, but the subsidy relates only to the employment and not the training of eligible workers. Of the previously unemployed on the Learnership programme, 73 per cent are in Learnership programmes at large firms. Very few report being in Learnership programmes at smaller firms. This is thought to be the result of the high costs associated with administering the Learnership programme.
After the implementation of the various programmes discussed above, youth unemployment remains stubbornly high in South Africa. The ETI was proposed in addition to many of the other policies and programmes aimed at youths. The difference is that the ETI aimed to stimulate the demand for youth labour by lowering the relative cost of hiring an inexperienced youth.
Employers of new workers who are no more than 29 years of age and who do not earn more than R6,000 a month qualify for the subsidy. Domestic workers and public sector employees are not eligible. The maximum amount of the subsidy is R1,000, which is paid for earnings between R2,000 and R4,000 3 . The subsidy is thus relatively very large for workers earning R2,000. It is phased in for income below R2,000 and is phased out in the region of R4,000-R6,000. The shape of the subsidy is depicted in Figure 2 . The amount of the subsidy is halved during the second year of employment, with a maximum subsidy of R500. The subsidy is not automatic, and the subsidy claim is offset by a monthly reduction in the amount of pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) taxes that the employer needs to pay to SARS. This means that the wage received by the employee is not affected and employees may not be aware that employers are claiming the subsidy for their employment. The policy does not require any training for the employed youths and is available to all industries. No requirements are placed on length of unemployment for eligible youths as is sometimes seen in similar policies in other countries. During the first full year of operation, around 30 per cent of eligible youths benefitted from the system. In 2018, the take-up rate had risen to approximately 50 per cent. 4 
Theoretical framework
Wage subsidies can be offered either to the job seeker or to the firm. A subsidy can be claimed by a job seeker once employment has been found. Also known as worker-side subsidies, wage subsidies offered to job seekers aim to increase labour supply in the market and are often seen in developed countries. Such policies include the Earned Income Tax Credit in the United States, Working Families' Tax Credit in Britain, the Self-Sufficiency Project in Canada, and other programmes in Australia, New Zealand, Finland, Ireland, and Belgium (Smith 1993 ).
Firm-side subsidies are subsidies given to firms when the firm employs individuals eligible for the subsidy. The aim of a firm-side subsidy is to incentivize firms to hire eligible individuals they would otherwise not be interested in hiring. A wage subsidy decreases the cost of employing an individual but without any change in the amount the individual is paid. This allows firms to increase employment of the subsidized group and output, leaving the wages of the subsidized individual unchanged. The elasticity of labour demand and the amount of the subsidy determines the increase in employment at a firm. Of the two types of subsidies, the firm-side subsidy fits the South African context as it deals with the demand for youth labour where the youth labour supply is already high.
In recent years, tax credits have been discussed as a policy tool for reducing the cost of hiring groups with high unemployment rates. The policy discussion in South Africa is simple: targeted tax credits can boost employment of youths. Although firms could potentially pocket the tax credit as economic rent or release older workers in order to hire younger workers, the policy includes a penalty to firms found doing this.
A wage subsidy has the potential to increase the demand for labour through the reduction in labour costs at firms. In Figure 3 this is described by the shift to the right of the aggregate demand for labour in the economy from LD1 to LD2.
Where the labour supply curve LS is upward sloping the effect of the subsidy will be shared between the workers and the firms depending on the elasticity of labour demand and labour supply. This raises the wages of workers from W0 to W1 and decreases the cost of employment to firms from W0 to W1 -C. The amount of labour demanded moves from QL0 to QL1. We consider the case where labour supply is highly elastic as the unemployment rate in South Africa is high. In the second scenario there is a small increase in wages to workers and a large reduction in the cost of employment to firms. The amount of labour demanded moves from QL0 to QL2, a larger increase than in the first scenario. In both scenarios it is expected that the wages of targeted workers will increase.
Data
We use two different datasets to investigate the impacts of the reform. The first is PALMS 3.2, a publicly available dataset from DataFirst at the University of Cape Town (Kerr et al. 2017) . The dataset provides consistent and harmonized survey information about employment and wages and is representative of the population. We use years 2000-17 from the dataset. The survey provides information about employment and unemployment rates, and it also has a number of demographic variables.
The other data source we use is the administrative tax data, which is based on the PAYE reports (IRP5 forms) by employers to SARS. Through a joint initiative between SARS, the National Treasury, and UNU-WIDER, the anonymized tax data from these IRP5 forms were made available for approved research at a secure data facility at the National Treasury in Pretoria.
The data are population wide with detailed information about earnings, as well as the actual ETI use status. However, the administrative data only have information about gender, and have no other demographic characteristics. These data cover the years 2011 to 2018. While all the work contained herein was conducted at the secure data facility, the results are not official statistics and have been created for this research.
The use of administrative tax records is advantageous for the evaluation of the ETI. The subsidy is claimed through a reduction in taxes owed to SARS, which means there are records of these claims for every firm that claimed the subsidy. The subsidy is available to all firms registered for PAYE and the administrative data represent the entire population of PAYE firms irrespective of their claim on the subsidy. The data are panel in nature, which allows us to observe tax-paying individuals before the start of the subsidy and during implementation. Since workers may be unaware of their employers claiming the subsidy, a survey of workers would not provide us with the information we need for this evaluation.
The primary disadvantage of using administrative data is their lack of demographic information and for this reason we chose to use both survey and tax data for our analysis.
Empirical approach
The main approach is to estimate the intention to treat (ITT) or the impact of being eligible on the subsidy using a triple differences strategy as follows:
where yi,t is the outcome variable (such as earnings or employment) for individual i in year t, youthi is an indicator variable with value equal to one if the individual is at most 29 years old, lowi is an indicator of whether the individual belongs to the low-wage group, and aftert is an indicator which is one for the years after the reform. We are interested in coefficient of the triple interaction term, ℎ * * , , which measures the impact of being eligible for the youth wage subsidy system. We also start with a simple double difference strategy, where the interest is about the term ℎ * , . In this case the analysis examines the impact on all young workers.
The identifying assumption is that there are no differential trends that would have affected young low-wage workers differently than older low-wage workers or higher-wage young workers. Because of the difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) approach, we can control for simultaneous changes that affect all young or all low-wage workers. We are not aware of any simultaneous changes which would have affected the treated group in a different way than those in the control group.
While the policy took effect in 2014, it appears that firms were slow to learn about it, and hence we drop this year from the analysis.
The challenge in this analysis is that the earnings level is only observed if the individual is working. As a solution to this, in the PALMS analysis, we predict income based on pre-reform data, using a model with age, gender, and years of education as regressors. This approach provides a good predictor of individuals' earnings, since the income levels differ markedly between socioeconomic groups (see Table 1 ). The dummy takes a value of one if the predicted income level is greater than the median. Alternatively, we calculate the ETI amount based on the predicted wage.
Instead of a simple dummy, we mostly use year fixed effects. To allow for differential trends between groups of workers, we add youth-specific and low wage-specific linear pre-trends to some of the models. In the analysis using administrative data, we cannot use demographic variables to predict earnings, but the missing earnings problem does not arise, of course, since what is in the data are earnings for those who actually work. While we recognize that the earnings can be endogenous, we use the actual wage rates to divide workers into low-wage and higher-wage categories.
Finally, instead of using a simple ETI eligibility dummy, we use the ETI amount that the person would have (based on predicted earnings) as a regressor as follows:
This specification caters for the possibility that the actual monetary amount of the subsidy probably also matters for the employment prospects.
We conduct the analysis for all eligible as well as for various sub-groups, such as men versus women, 18-24 year olds, 25-29 year olds, and by dividing the analysis with the ETI dummy according to the earnings level (below 2,000; 2,000-4,000, 4000-6000). The heterogenous impacts are discussed in section Error! Reference source not found..
Results on employment and unemployment
We first examine the intention-to-treat impacts of the policy on employment and unemployment rates. Figure 4 and 5 provide graphical information about the trends in these outcomes. The graphs are normalised in 2013, before the policy start. Figure 4 suggests there appears to have been a trend break for the employment rates for the target (or eligible) group of low-wage young workers in 2015 but with employment rates returning to the 2013 rates by 2016. Figure 5 suggests that there has been no trend break in the unemployment rate for low wage young workers. The actual regression results on employment and unemployment are presented in Table 2 and 0. Column (1) presents a simple difference-in-differences estimate, whereas Column (2) removes a potentially different pre-trend between the treatment and control groups by estimating the trend from pre-reform data, predicting it for the post-reform years and subtracting this prediction from actual outcomes. Column (3) presents a triple difference estimate for a treatment dummy, while Column (5) presents the estimate for the actual ETI amount the individual would be eligible for. Columns (4) and (6) have been adjusted for differential pre-trends using the procedure described above but are otherwise the same as (3) and (5), respectively. The results suggest that there have been no employment gains nor a decrease in unemployment for youths or low-wage youths. (2) present DD estimates and (3)-(6) present DDD estimates. In columns (1)-(4), the estimate is the coefficient of a dummy variable, whereas columns (5) and (6) present estimates for the actual subsidy value. Columns (2), (4), and (6) are adjusted to pre-trend differences between the groups. The mean is the mean employment rate for the target group (youth in columns 1 and 2 and low-wage youth in columns 3-4) before the reform. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors' own estimates using PALMS 3.2. (1) and (2) present DD estimates and (3)-(6) DDD estimates. In columns (1)- (4), the estimate is the coefficient of a dummy variable, whereas columns (5) and (6) present estimates for the actual subsidy value. Columns (2), (4), and (6) are adjusted to pre-trend differences between the groups. The mean is the mean unemployment rate for the target group (youth in columns 1 and 2 and low-wage youth in columns 3-4) before the reform. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Authors' own estimates using PALMS 3.2.
The ETI is also offered to part time workers. Firms can respond to the ETI by employing young workers for more hours than they were previously able to. We therefore examine the number of hours worked along the intensive margin using the survey data in Figure 6 and Table 4 . (1) and (2) present DD estimates and (3)-(6) DDD estimates. In columns (1)-(4), the estimate is the coefficient of a dummy variable, whereas columns (5) and (6) present estimates for the actual subsidy value. Columns (2), (4), and (6) are adjusted to group-specific pre-trends. The mean is the mean working hours for the target group (youth in columns 1 and 2 and low-wage youth in columns 3-4) before the reform. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
From the survey data we see no impact in employment, unemployment or hours worked for the target group. It appears that there is no robust evidence that the ETI subsidy system has contributed to greater youth employment at the aggregate level. In the next section we examine the employment, entry, exits and earnings using the tax data.
Incidence and labour market transitions
We start by examining the take-up behaviour in more detail. This provides a backdrop for the remaining analysis, as it indicates among which population groups the intention-to-treat impacts may be the greatest. Source: Authors' calculations using SARS data. Table 5 provides a breakdown of ETI take-up by year, gender and age. It also displays those sectors where the take-up rate has been the highest. The mean take-up rate is somewhat higher among women. It is also much greater among younger workers in the eligible age group and among typical low-wage sectors, such as agriculture and retail. Perhaps the most pertinent feature which emerges from the table is that the take-up rate has been steadily increasing over the years. Based on this information, we would expect that the impacts could be greatest among the younger age groups during the latest years.
Results using the tax data
Using the tax data, we examine four outcomes: number of jobs, earnings, entry into employment and exit from employment. As above, we first examine the development of key variables using graphical evidence and regression results.
Number of Jobs
As we cannot observe employment and unemployment rates in the administrative data, we approach the employment outcome by dividing the data into cells based on gender, age, and R500 wage intervals. We then examine the number of jobs in each cell before and after the reform.
The log number of jobs for the eligible group appear to have no change in Figure 7 even when we examine the normalized log number of jobs. We estimate the triple differences on the number of jobs using the tax data in Table 6 below. The results using the ETI dummy in columns (1) to (3) indicate that there is no increase in the log number of jobs. Columns (4) and (5) present estimates for the actual subsidy value and again see no increase in the log number of jobs. Considering the way in which the subsidy is designed we think the null result could be driven by heterogenous effects within the target group (0-R6,000) based on the value of the subsidy received (or monthly income on which the subsidy is based). Notes: The table presents estimation results where the dependent variable is the log of the number of jobs in cells determined by age, gender, and R500 wage interval. All columns present DDD estimates. In columns (1)- (3), the estimate is the coefficient of a dummy variable, whereas columns (4) and (5) present estimates for the actual subsidy value. Columns (2)- (5) control for a potential difference in pre-existing trends between the treatment and control groups. First, we regress log number of jobs for years 2011 to 2013 (before the policy) on group fixed effects and two group specific time trends. Then we use the residuals as the outcome in the model. The mean is the mean log number of jobs for the target group.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Source: Authors' own estimates using IRP5 data.
We examine the number of jobs within wage groups based on the design of the policy. Graphic evidence within R2,000 -R4,000 wage group in Figure 8 below suggests there could be some employment increases in this group. Source: Authors' own estimates using IRP5 data.
In Table 7 we examine the impact of the ETI on the number of jobs within wage groups. In columns (1) we examine the wage group earning less than R2,000. In column (2) we examine job in the R2,001-R4,000 wage group and column (3) examines jobs in the R4,001-R6000 wage group. There are more clear positive significant increases in the number of jobs in the lower wage groups and negative but insignificant affects on the number of jobs in the higher wage groups. Notes: The table presents estimation results where the dependent variable is the log of the number of jobs in cells determined by age, gender, and R500 wage interval. All columns present DDD estimates for treatment years using estimates for the actual subsidy value. We control for any potential differences in pre-existing trends between the treatment and control groups. The mean is the mean log number of jobs for the target group.
Overall there are no clear increases in the number of jobs using the tax data. This is in line with the null result from the survey data. Given the way in which the policy was designed, there is an incentive for the number of jobs to increase around the maximum subsidy which we see in the results from Table 7 . However, the large number of workers in the R4,001-R6,000 is driving overall zero impact found in Table 6 .
Earnings
We investigate the response in earnings level to detect the incidence of the subsidy. The mean log earnings for the eligible group appear to have no change in Figure 9 (left panel). The normalised earnings graph (right panel) show that the eligible group experience a faster increase in earnings after the reform. Source: Authors' own estimates using IRP5 data.
Figure 10 depicts the developments in the earnings distribution for young workers between 2013-2015 and 2013-2018 . Because of the nominal earnings growth, the distribution has shifted to the right. Early in the system, the general shift was the only marked change, whereas five years into the system, in 2018, a spike in the distribution is visible at the R2,000 level, that is, where the subsidy rate is the greatest. It is likely that the employers have gradually learnt more about the system and have been able to adjust to offering jobs according to the incentives created by the system. Source: Authors' own estimates using IRP5 data.
Since we can establish whose employers have used the ETI, we examine the wage distribution by ETI-claiming status (Figure 11 ). The results confirm that there is now more mass in the wage distribution for ETI-supported jobs, whereas the distribution of workers has not changed for ETI non-claimers. In Figure 12 we examine the changes in wage distribution in a DD manner. The figure depicts the distribution of wages and changes over time for young and for older workers, respectively. There is wage growth for both younger and older workers and both an increase and a decrease in wages in the R2,000-R4,000 range. The subsidy to wage percentage is highest (50%) for those who earn R2,000 and less. The subsidy is a flat R1,000 in the R2,000-R4,000 range with a subsidy to wage percentage from 50% to 25%. This suggests that there has been a response in the wages. Source: Authors' own estimates using IRP5 data.
The increase in the number of jobs for the ETI youth is concentrated at the wage levels close to and above R2,000 with some missing mass after the R2,000 point. What is also noteworthy is the reduction in the number of workers earning below R2,000 among the ETI-supported youth. Table 8 presents the regression results on log earnings for the eligible group (earning less than R6,000). The results indicate that earnings have increased for the treatment group. This result could in principle be due to movement from the area below R2,000 to just R2,000 or to the area between R2,000-4,000. However, when the analysis is conducted among those who have always been in the latter range (not shown), earnings have also increased. (2) and (3) control for a potential difference in pre-existing trends between the treatment and control groups. Column (3) includes the treatment year specific estimates. The mean is the earnings for the target group.).
The graphical evidence and regression estimates on earnings suggests that, somewhat surprisingly, and in contrast to the latest international literature, the incidence on the subsidy is (partly) on workers.
Entry into Employment
We examine entry into employment as the ETI is very similar to a hiring subsidy and could have the greatest impact Figure 13 . Entry into employment Notes: The figure on the left compares the log number of jobs of young low wage (eligible), older (30-35 years) low wage and young high wage (R6,000 -R7,500) workers. The figure on the right compares low wage young and older workers Source: Authors' own estimates using IRP5 data.
In Figure 13 we look at the entry into employment for the target group as well as the two control groups, higher wage youth and low wage older workers. It appears that there could be an increase in entry for the target group in the graph on the right. Table 9 shows the regression result for entry into employment. The overall effect is zero, or even negative. Column (3) also includes year-specific treatment indicators suggesting an increase in entry in the first few two years then a decrease in entry in the latest two years. The effect on entry is negative and significant when we use the ETI amount (subsidy value). Only DDD estimates are presented. Columns (2) and (3) control for a potential difference in pre-existing trends between the treatment and control groups. Column (3) includes the treatment year specific estimates. Column (4) presents DDD estimates for the actual subsidy value. The mean is the mean share of new jobs for the target group.
Together these results point to heterogenous effects driven from different wage groups.
Exit from Employment
Finally, we examine the impacts of the policy on exits from employment. It is not clear a priori what the impacts should be: a hiring subsidy does not necessarily lengthen employment spells, but given the very high rate of churning 5 for the young workers at the South African labour market, the fact that the subsidy is available for 24 months may still lower the exit rates. In addition, if the workers learn new skills on the job, they may be more employable also after the subsidy has expired. The results, presented in Table 10 , indicate that exit rates have declined for the treatment group because of the policy. Columns (1) and (2) present DD estimates, and (3)-(6) DDD estimates. In columns (5)- (6), year-specific treatment dummies are presented. Columns (2), (4), and (6) control for a potential difference in pre-existing trends between the treatment and control groups. First, we regress log earnings for years 2011 to 2013 (before the policy) on group fixed effects and two group specific time trends. Then we use the residuals as the outcome in the model. The mean is the earnings for the target group (youth in columns 1 and 2 and low-wage youth in columns 3-4). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Conclusion
We examined the earnings and employment impacts of a South African wage subsidy system, the Employment Tax Incentive. It has been available for the employers of workers below 30 years earning at most R6,000 a month. Because of the targeted nature of the policy, we were able to utilize a triple difference estimation strategy, with both older workers in the same earnings range and young workers slightly above the wage criteria to the control group. Our analysis relied on two data sets: The PALMS harmonized survey to estimate the employment and unemployment rate responses and the population-wide administrative payroll records from the South African Revenue Service (SARS) to estimate earnings responses as well as transitions to and from employment.
The analysis reveals that the policy has not increased the employment rate or reduced the unemployment rate for the eligible group. Despite this negative finding, we found that the policy led to an increase in the earnings for the target group. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that more new jobs very created to the range where the subsidy is the greatest (when earnings are between R2,000 and R4,000), but on the other hand, mean earnings even within this subsample increased. The policy also reduced the exit rates for the target group, probably because the subsidy can be claimed for two years in circumstances where close to 50 per cent of jobs for low-wage youth terminate within a year.
The results we derive are at odds with the most recent influential work on the employment impacts of wage subsidies, including Cahuc et al. (2018) and Saez et al. (2019) . We found very limited overall employment impacts (although there was an increase in entry in the earnings range where the subsidy was the greatest) and our results also indicate that the incidence of the system was partly on workers.
Further analysis is needed to understand quite why the effects are worse than what the international evidence would lead one to expect. We will expand the analysis by concentrating on industries where the take-up rate has been the greatest to examine whether the (at least initially) low take-up of the policy is behind the disappointing overall performance. In future work, we will also examine whether the policy has had any impacts on employment and earnings more than 2 years afterwards for those workers who very initially supported by the system but whose eligibility has already expired. This would be a way to measure whether the hiring subsidy is able to generate longer term employment gains.
